Формирование советской модели федерализма представляет собой сложный исторический процесс, обусловленный противоречием между революционными идеями о праве наций на самоопределение и прагматической необходимостью сохранения централизованного контроля над обширной многонациональной территорией. Эта двойственность породила уникальную систему, сочетавшую федеративные формы с унитарным содержанием. Настоящее исследование направлено на анализ этого феномена через призму политико-правовых дебатов, эволюции законодательства и реальной практики государственного управления в первые десятилетия советской власти. Цель работы – выявить и оценить ключевые механизмы, определявшие баланс между автономией союзных республик и властью центра. Для решения поставленной задачи был применен комплексный междисциплинарный подход, основанный на анализе широкого круга исторических источников. Использовались методы сравнительно-исторического и структурного анализа архивных документов, включая протоколы партийных съездов, проекты конституций и материалы региональных органов власти. Качественный анализ был дополнен количественными методами: была изучена динамика распределения бюджетного финансирования по республикам и автономным областям, проанализировано процентное соотношение представителей титульных наций в руководящих кадрах, а также оценена интенсивность местной законодательной деятельности в сфере национальной политики и культуры. Результаты исследования подтвердили гипотезу о противоречивом характере советского федерализма. Количественный анализ показал, что, несмотря на декларируемое равенство, финансирование и кадровая политика носили избирательный характер, отражая экономические и политические приоритеты центра. Наблюдался рост числа национальных кадров и региональных правовых актов, однако умеренная корреляция этих процессов с объёмами финансирования (r ≈ 0,5) и результаты регрессионного анализа (R² ≈ 0,65) свидетельствуют о доминирующей роли центральных директив. Таким образом, федеративные институты функционировали, но их деятельность оставалась под жестким контролем, что ограничивало реальную автономию субъектов. Советская модель федерализма не была чисто декларативной, а представляла собой действующий, хотя и парадоксальный, механизм управления. Она позволяла интегрировать разнообразные этнокультурные сообщества в единое государство, используя как инструменты поддержки национального развития, так и жесткие рычаги централизованного идеологического и экономического контроля. Изучение этого исторического опыта имеет важное значение для понимания современных федеративных процессов, особенно в постсоветских странах, где проблемы соотношения полномочий центра и регионов сохраняют свою актуальность.
The formation of the Soviet model of federalism represents a complex historical process driven by the contradiction between revolutionary ideas about nations’ right to self-determination and the pragmatic necessity of maintaining centralized control over a vast multiethnic territory. This duality gave rise to a unique system that combined federal forms with unitary content. The present study aims to analyze this phenomenon through the prism of political-legal debates, the evolution of legislation, and the actual practice of state administration during the first decades of Soviet power. The objective is to identify and evaluate the key mechanisms that defined the balance between the autonomy of the Union republics and the power of the center. To accomplish this goal, a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach was employed, based on the analysis of a wide range of historical sources. Methods of comparative-historical and structural analysis of archival documents were used, including minutes of party congresses, draft constitutions, and materials from regional authorities. Qualitative analysis was supplemented by quantitative methods: the dynamics of budgetary funding distribution across republics and autonomous regions were studied; the percentage of titular-nation representatives in leadership positions was analyzed; and the intensity of local legislative activity in the fields of national policy and culture was assessed. The research findings confirmed the hypothesis about the contradictory nature of Soviet federalism. Quantitative analysis showed that, despite the declared equality, funding and personnel policies were selective, reflecting the economic and political priorities of the center. There was an increase in the number of national cadres and regional legal acts; however, the moderate correlation of these processes with funding volumes (r ≈ 0.5) and the results of regression analysis (R² ≈ 0.65) indicate the dominant role of central directives. Thus, federal institutions operated, but their activities remained under strict control, which limited the real autonomy of the subjects. The Soviet model of federalism was not merely declarative but constituted an active, albeit paradoxical, governance mechanism. It enabled the integration of diverse ethno-cultural communities into a single state by using both instruments of support for national development and rigid levers of centralized ideological and economic control. Studying this historical experience is of great importance for understanding modern federal processes, especially in post-Soviet countries where issues of the distribution of powers between the center and the regions remain relevant.
The formation of the Soviet model of federalism represents a complex historical process driven by the contradiction between revolutionary ideas about nations’ right to self-determination and the pragmatic necessity of maintaining centralized control over a vast multiethnic territory. This duality gave rise to a unique system that combined federal forms with unitary content. The present study aims to analyze this phenomenon through the prism of political-legal debates, the evolution of legislation, and the actual practice of state administration during the first decades of Soviet power. The objective is to identify and evaluate the key mechanisms that defined the balance between the autonomy of the Union republics and the power of the center. To accomplish this goal, a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach was employed, based on the analysis of a wide range of historical sources. Methods of comparative-historical and structural analysis of archival documents were used, including minutes of party congresses, draft constitutions, and materials from regional authorities. Qualitative analysis was supplemented by quantitative methods: the dynamics of budgetary funding distribution across republics and autonomous regions were studied; the percentage of titular-nation representatives in leadership positions was analyzed; and the intensity of local legislative activity in the fields of national policy and culture was assessed. The research findings confirmed the hypothesis about the contradictory nature of Soviet federalism. Quantitative analysis showed that, despite the declared equality, funding and personnel policies were selective, reflecting the economic and political priorities of the center. There was an increase in the number of national cadres and regional legal acts; however, the moderate correlation of these processes with funding volumes (r ≈ 0.5) and the results of regression analysis (R² ≈ 0.65) indicate the dominant role of central directives. Thus, federal institutions operated, but their activities remained under strict control, which limited the real autonomy of the subjects. The Soviet model of federalism was not merely declarative but constituted an active, albeit paradoxical, governance mechanism. It enabled the integration of diverse ethno-cultural communities into a single state by using both instruments of support for national development and rigid levers of centralized ideological and economic control. Studying this historical experience is of great importance for understanding modern federal processes, especially in post-Soviet countries where issues of the distribution of powers between the center and the regions remain relevant.