The study analyzes legal models of asymmetric federalism in a state with a diverse territorial structure and in federations with a multi-level system of autonomies in order to identify patterns of their formation and evolution as well as the consequences for the integrity and stability of the state system. The materials include state constitutions, legislation on the delineation of powers, agreements on the distribution of competences, acts of constitutional justice, and other normative sources reflecting the transformation of federal relations. The methodological basis incorporates comparative legal, formal legal, historical legal, and systemic approaches, as well as the analysis of law enforcement practice of constitutional and supreme courts that reveals actual mechanisms of asymmetry functioning. It is shown that the studied state evolved from a treaty-based model with a high degree of decentralization and pronounced legal asymmetry in the 1990s to a rigidly centralized construction in which differences among constituent entities are mainly limited to fiscal-budgetary and ethno cultural aspects, while the key role was played by the abandonment of treaty practice and the unification of the status of regional authorities through framework federal laws and the judicial doctrine of constitutional supremacy. A comparison with federations where a multi-level system of autonomies operates demonstrates a fundamentally different nature of asymmetry, which is initially embedded in the constitutional model, serves as an instrument for integrating historically and culturally distinct territories, and is supported by stable guarantees of autonomy combined with a developed system of judicial arbitration between the center and the regions. It is discussed that excessive centralization, while formally maintaining a federal form, leads to a reduction of space for regional political agency and creates the risk of accumulating latent conflicts, whereas asymmetry, considered as a long-term mechanism of accommodating diversity, contributes to a more flexible distribution of competences and reduces integration costs. The conclusion is made about the need for a more delicate balance between unification and the recognition of differences in the further modification of the federalism model, as well as about the importance of institutionalizing asymmetry in transparent and predictable legal forms to strengthen the stability of the politico-territorial system.